The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Geiger’s realist and Wollheim’s projectionist accounts on expressive properties and expressive perception by considering them within the larger contexts from which they emerged, by using as far as possible a common language and by focusing on the questions of the nature of expressive properties and of how we grasp them. My aim is to show that it is possible to put into dialogue phenomenological and Anglo-American aesthetics and that this dialogue might lead (...) to new insights about how we engage with art. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of Martha Nussbaum’s description of the capability approach, and offers an alternative. I will argue that Nussbaum’s characterization of the capability approach is flawed, in two ways. First, she unduly limits the capability to two strands of work, thereby ignoring important other capabilitarian scholarship. Second, she argues that there are five essential elements that all capability theories meet; yet upon closer analysis three of them are not really essential to the capability approach. I also offer (...) an alternative description of the capability approach, which is called the cartwheel view of the capability approach. This view is at the same time radically multidisciplinary yet also contains a foundationally robust core among its various usages, and is therefore much better able to make the case that the capability approach can be developed in a very wide range of more specific normative theories. Finally, the cartwheel view is used to argue against Nussbaum's claim that all capabilitarian political theory needs to be politically liberal. (shrink)

The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine critically and discuss the role of imagination in science and religion, with particular emphasis on its possible epistemic, creative, and meaning-making functions. In order to answer my research questions, I apply theories and concepts from contemporary philosophy of mind on scientific and religious practices. This framework allows me to explore the mental state of imagination, not as an isolated phenomenon but, rather, as one of many mental states that co-exist and interplay (...) in our cogntive architecture. Based on the philosophical discourse of philosophy of mind, four types of imagination are indentified and conceptualized: sensory, propositional, experiential, and creative imagination. These categories are then employed on five phenomena that can be found in scientific and religious environments: metaphors, models, thought experiments, aspect perception, and - in the religious case - rituals. In relation to the concept of religious "seeing" I consider how imaginings may influence visionary experiences and visualization, and compare these phenomena with cases of scientific visualization and eureka experiences. In regard to scientific and religious models, a distinction is made between, on the one hand, two notions of truth and, on the other hand, truth-independent meaning-making. In light of these categories, I differentiate between, and critically discuss, the use of imagination in doxastic, non-doxastic and fictionalist accounts. In light of this investigation, I formulate and defend the position of interactivism, which acknowledges a constant interplay between different attitudes and mental states. In my examination of rituals and scientific and religious thought experiments, special attention is given to the mental capacity to recreate the experiences that are entailed in an imagined scenario. At the end of the investigation, I consider the possible impact that my study might have on how we view science and religion as well as the dialogue bewteen these two fields. (shrink)

This article proposes that the prime ideals of the university - those of truth, knowledge, justice, and emancipation - are also those that currently produce unjust practices "outside" and "within". Using the work of Jacques Derrida and Paul Virilio, the article argues that the central problem of the university today consists not so much of a neo-liberalisation, but of the speeding-up of these ideals through their enmeshment with techniques of calculation, vision, and prediction. The current university therefore suffers from what (...) it with Derrida identifies as an "auto-immune disease," in which the acceleration of its foundational aspirations have led to a near-total subjugation of all and everything to an oppressive quest for transparency. However, the article proposes via Virilio that this totalising transparency paradoxically also produces more blindness, accidents, and unknowability. It hopes to illustrate this with some examples in the teaching scene as well by working through some of its own conceptual tensions. The other logic of the university today, the article finally proposes, consists of a "dark" or stealth functionality, opening up the promise of a radically different future and unanticipated resistance despite itself. (shrink)

Recenzio Kiraly V. Istvan Death and History c. konyverol.

Dans cet article, j’analyse trois logiques normatives qui peuvent fonder les politiques éducatives en portant une attention particulière aux questions liées aux spécificités des sexes. Ces trois modèles éducatifs sont la théorie du capital humain, le discours du droit et l’approche des potentialités. D’abord, je décris cinq rôles que l’éducation peut jouer. Ensuite, j’analyse les trois modèles pouvant fonder les politiques éducatives. La théorie du capital humain pose un certain nombre de problèmes parce qu’elle s’avère économiciste, fragmentée et essentiellement instrumentaliste. (...) Le discours du droit et l’approche des potentialités sont en principe des modèles multidimensionnels et inclusifs et peuvent par le fait même tenir compte des rôles intrinsèques et non éco- nomicistes de l’éducation. Toutefois, selon la manière dont quelqu’un satisfait aux exigences spécifiques des cadres théoriques du droit et des potentialités, ceux-ci peuvent également présenter des difficultés. Je termine cet article en soutenant que la visée intrinsèque des politiques éducatives devrait être d’augmenter les potentialités des individus et que nous devrions employer les discours du droit de façon stratégique, c’est-à-dire lorsqu’il est probable qu’ils amènent les gens à réaliser leurs potentialités. (shrink)

Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual‐process virtue, consisting of imagination1 (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination2 (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual‐process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology, providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General Reliability (GR) and Functional (...) System Reliability (FSR), for example in relation to Kengo Miyazono and Uko Tooming's (2023) argument for epistemic generativity. Furthermore, the paper claims that the dual‐process virtue account enables us to integrate a wide range of findings from the literature on epistemology and imagination. Moreover, it suggests a novel way to distinguish the virtues of creativity and imagination and presents a case for viewing imagination as a virtue rather than a skill. (shrink)

In this essay I want to offer an analysis of the structure of the fictional emotions that we have reading novels. I shall start with a presentation of the structure of emotions in general and their relation to aesthetic fiction. Afterwards, I shall offer a critical review of the current positions on fictional emotions. The aim of this section is to question the presuppositions that dominate the current debate on fictional emotions in particular and on emotions in general. Finally, I (...) shall develop my own account on this issue. The thesis that I am going to defend is that fictional emotions possess doxastic and practical rationality and that they are full fledged emotional experiences the reality of which we should not doubt, even though they show some peculiarities. Key Words: Fictional emotion, quasi-emotion, doxastic rationality, practical rationality, assumption. (shrink)

This chapter aims to reconstruct the phenomenological theories on hatred developed by Scheler, Pfänder and Kolnai and to refl ect upon its anthropological implications. Four essential aspects of this phenomenon are analyzed, taking as point of departure the works of these authors: (1) its place in the taxonomy of the affective life; (2) the world of its objects; (3) its expression in the form of bodily manifestations and motivating force; and (4) the inherent possibilities for overcoming it. The chapter concludes (...) that hatred is a key phenomenon for understanding aspects of human nature that we generally try to ignore or overlook. (shrink)

Abstract In this chapter, we challenge the presupposed concept of innovation in the responsible innovation literature. As a first step, we raise several questions with regard to the possibility of ‘responsible’ innovation and point at several difficulties which undermine the supposedly responsible character of innovation processes, based on an analysis of the input, throughput and output of innovation processes. It becomes clear that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly problematic and that a more thorough inquiry (...) of the concept is required. As a second step, we analyze the concept of innovation which is self-evidently presupposed in current literature on responsible innovation. It becomes clear that innovation is self-evidently seen as (1) technological innovation, (2) is primarily perceived from an economic perspective, (3) is inherently good and (4) presupposes a symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees. By challenging this narrow and uncritical concept of innovation, we contribute to a second round of theorizing about the concept and provide a research agenda for future research in order to enhance a less naïve concept of responsible innovation. (shrink)

Eine Grundmotivation, sich mit fiktionaler Literatur zu beschäftigen, liegt in ihrer Fähigkeit, uns Lebenswahrheiten zu vermitteln, die Welt aus einer anderen Perspektive zu zeigen und unseren Erfahrungshorizont zu erweitern. In all diesen Fällen handelt es sich um Metaphern, die auf die kognitive Relevanz unserer Auseinandersetzung mit literarischen Werken hinweisen. Die Erklärung dieser Metaphern kann nicht nur unsere Beschäftigung mit fiktionaler Literatur, sondern auch den Begriff der Erkenntnis und seine Vielfalt erhellen. In diesem Buch wird eine akkurate Analyse des kognitiven Werts (...) fiktionaler Literatur unternommen. Neben der Vermittlung von Wahrheiten und propositionalem Wissen steht im Mittelpunkt des Buches die Untersuchung von Erkenntnisformen, welchen bislang eher wenig Aufmerksamkeit zuteil wurde. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden perspektivische, phänomenale, empathische und ethische Erkenntnisse in Betracht gezogen. Es sind insbesondere die letztgenannten Erkenntnisformen diejenigen, die für die Literatur kennzeichnend sind und die es uns ermöglichen, über uns selbst hinauszuschauen und unsere Existenz in verschiedener Form zu bereichern. (shrink)

Review the Istvan Kiraly V.'s book: Death and History.

This article argues that religious emotions are variations of general emotions that we already know from our everyday life, which nevertheless exhibit specific features that enable us to think of them as forming a coherent subclass. The article claims that there is an experience of joy, sorrow, regret, fear, and so on that is specifically religious. The aim is to develop an account that specifies what makes them “religious.” The argument is developed in three stages. The first section develops a (...) phenomenologically inspired account of the emotions by focusing on three of their moments: phenomenal quality, cognitive dependency, and intentionality. Drawing on this theory, section 2 distinguishes the class of religious emotions from similar phenomena. The third and final section examines the main features of religious emotions. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the possible thought experimenting qualities of Soren Kierkegaard's novel Fear and Trembling and in which way it can be explanatory. Kierkegaard's preference for pseudonyms, indirect communication, Socratic interrogation, and performativity are identified as features that provide the narrative with its thought experimenting quality. It is also proposed that this literary fiction functions as a Socratic-theological thought experiment due to its influences from both philosophy and theology. In addition, I suggest three functional levels of the fictional (...) narrative that, in different ways, influence its possible explanatory force. As a theoretical background for the investigation, two accounts of literary cognitivism are explored: Noel Carroll's Argument Account and Catherine Elgin's Exemplification Account. In relation to Carroll's proposal, I conclude that Fear and Trembling develops a philosophical argumentation that is dependent on the reader's own existential contribution. In relation to Elgin's thought, the relation between truth and explanatory force is acknowledged. At the end of the article, I argue that it is more accurate to see the explanatory force of Fear and Trembling in relation to its exploratory function. (shrink)

Why is it that we respond emotionally to plays, movies, and novels and feel moved by characters and situations that we know do not exist? This question, which constitutes the kernel of the debate on »the paradox of fiction«, speaks to the perennial themes of philosophy, and remains of interest to this day. But does this question entail a paradox? A significant group of analytic philosophers have indeed thought so. Since the publication of Colin Radford's celebrated paper »How Can We (...) Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?« (1975), the number of proposals to solve, explain, reformulate, dismiss or even revitalize this apparent paradox has continued to proliferate. In line with recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, in this paper I will argue against the sustainability of the paradox, claiming that the only reasonable way to continue our discussions about it consists in using it as a heuristic tool to shed light on problems regarding our involvement with fiction. Against this background, I will then focus on one of the problems related to how our emotional responses to fiction contribute to our appreciation of it. The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section shows the parallel evolution of the paradox of fiction and the analytic philosophy of emotion. Here I claim that, although the paradox is epistemically flawed, since one of its premises is rooted in a limited view on the emotions typical of early cognitiv-ism, the discussions it provokes are still epistemically useful. As Robert Stecker (2011, 295), among others, has pointed out, the paradox was formulated during the heyday of cognitive theories of the emotions in which emotion necessarily requires belief. Today, however, only few authors would endorse this premise. If emotion does not always require belief (as the majority of authors in the contemporary debate admit), let alone belief about the existence of the object towards which it is directed, then there is no reason to speak of a paradox. From this first conclusion, however, it does not follow that the paradox is completely without use from the epistemic point of view. A glimpse at the topics touched on during the discussions about how to solve, reformulate, or negate the paradox reveals their value in shedding light on the interrelation between emotion and fiction. The second section elaborates a phenomenologically inspired cognitive account of the emotions by focusing on their cognitive bases, their influence on Emotion in the Appreciation of Fiction 205 cognitions, and their cognitive function. In this model, emotions are responsible for indicating values, for showing what matters to us, and for being appropriate to their objects. My claim is that this view applies not only to reality, but also to our involvement with fiction. In the final section I draw on this account to focus on one kind of appreciation of fiction which necessarily requires our emotional involvement. Following an idea put forward by Susan Feagin (1996, 1), I employ the concept of »appre-ciation« to refer to a set of abilities exercised with the aim of extracting value from the work. There is a long tradition in aesthetics that condemns any focus on the emotions in the appreciation of art and fiction, and defends the necessity of aesthetic appreciation without emotional influence. To refer to this negative attitude towards the emotions, I will borrow an expression coined by Susan Feagin (2013, 636), who refers to »the intellectualized view of appreciation«. Against this widespread view, I will argue that some aspects of the fiction can only be appreciated with the help of our emotions. The cognitive approach developed in the previous section can explain how the emotions might in fact play a significant role in the appreciation of art and fiction. Attention will be paid to three activities involved in appreciation, for all of which emotion is crucial: processing relevant information about the fictional world, understanding aspects of it, and becoming acquainted with the values it presents. My aim here is to argue that there are particular aspects of the fictional world that can only be appreciated if recipients have the appropriate emotions. (shrink)

The analysis of moral subject in consequentialist ethics (as a kind of nonutilitaristic consequentialism) aims to show, that moral subject is of basie importance for it - regardeless to the fact, that its analysis focuses predominantly on action and its concequences. It is the moral subject, which enables the action and its consequences to be performed. So understanding the conditions of moral subjecťs action means understanding the moral subject itself. This understanding draws upon the typology of moral subjects that makes (...) the prediction of certain kinds of action as well as oftheir consequencies possible. (shrink)

The notion of beauty has endured a troublesome history over the last few decades. While for centuries beauty has been considered one of the central values of art, there have also been times when it seemed old-fashioned to even mention the term. The present volume aims to explore the nature of beauty and to shed light its place in contemporary philosphy and art practice.

How to distinguish emotions such as envy, disgust, and shame from sentiments such as love, hate, and adoration? While the standard approach argues that emotions and sentiments differ in terms of their temporal structures (e.g., Ben-ze’ev, 2000; Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Frijda et al., 1991), this paper sketches an alternative approach according to which each of these states exhibits a distinctive intentional structure. More precisely, this paper argues that emotions and sentiments exhibit distinct forms of affective intentionality. The paper begins (...) by examining the temporal criteria of duration, etiology, and phenomenology widely employed to distinguish between both states. It demonstrates that none of them provides a clear-cut distinction between emotions and sentiments. Next, it presents the intentional approach as an alternative. To this end, it discusses what I call the axiological account (De Monticelli’s 2006; 2020), before introducing my version of the intentional approach according to which emotions and sentiments exhibit different forms of affective intentionality. The main findings are summarized in the conclusion. (shrink)

Antologia revistei Philobiblon editata in 2011.

In den letzten Jahrzehnten sind die Emotionen zu einem der zentralen Themen der Philosophie des Geistes geworden. Erstaunlich ist in diesem Kontext einer neuen Entdeckung der Gefühle, dass die frühen phänomenologischen Beiträge der ersten Schüler Husserls zu dem Thema in Vergessenheit geraten sind. Dabei können die Gefühlskonzeptionen und Analysen emotionaler Phänomene von Pfänder, Voigtländer, Haas, Geiger, Scheler, Stein, Walther, Kolnai, Ortega y Gasset wegen ihrer einzigartigen Präzision und Erfahrungsnähe die heutige Debatte entscheidend bereichern. In diesem Buch wird einerseits die Rekonstruktion (...) einer Theorie der Emotionen unternommen, welche implizit in den Texten der ersten Phänomenologen liegt. Andererseits werden systematische Antworten auf Fragen und Problemstellungen gegeben, welche die aktuelle Diskussion bestimmen. Was sind Emotionen? Inwiefern kann man von emotionaler Realität und Irrealität, Echtheit und Unechtheit sprechen? Kann es Emotionen über Fiktionen geben? Gibt es unterbewusste Emotionen? Welche Rolle spielen leibliche Aspekte? Was bedeutet es, dass Emotionen intentional sind? In welcher Beziehung stehen sie zu den Werten? Dies sind die Leitfragen des Buches. (shrink)

This article provides an analysis of the phenomenology of affectivity underlying the work of Edith Stein. Taking as point of departure two of her works, The problem of Empathy (1917) and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (1922), the paper focuses on the idea that emotions fulfil a cognitive function: they make us accessible the realm of values. The argument of the paper is developed in two sections. The first section offers an overview of Stein’s main theses about emotions, feelings, (...) moods and sentiments and places them within the larger framework of the early phenomenological accounts on affectivity. The second section examines the claim that emotions are responsible for grasping values concentrating on two facets of this thesis: the first regards the epistemological question according to which values are grasped by affective phenomena, while the second regards the ontological question about the nature of these grasped values. (shrink)

Vor etwa einem Jahrhundert entwickelte sich im deutschsprachigen Raum imRahmen einer allgemeinen Charakterisierung unserer ästhetischen Erfahrungvon Kunst eine umfassende Debatte über die Natur und die Möglichkeit vonGefühlen über fiktionale Charaktere und Situationen. Die damalige Debatteweist große Ähnlichkeit zur heutigen analytischen Debatte über das Paradoxonder Fiktion auf. Trotz des unterschiedlichen jeweiligen historischen Kontextesfindet sich in der analytischen Debatte und in der Philosophie zu Beginn des20. Jahrhunderts fast der gleiche Lösungsansatz. Gefühle über Fiktionen seienQuasi-Gefühle, d.h. ein gefühlsartiges Phänomen mit einer Realität sui (...) generis ,dem im Unterschied zu den wirklichen Gefühlen kein Urteil über die Existenzdes Objektes zugrunde liegt und dem die Verbindung zur Motivation fehlt. Zieldieses Aufsatzes ist es, eine Untersuchung der These der Quasi-Gefühle An-fang des 20. Jahrhunderts zu unternehmen sowie die Analogien zur heutigenDebatte zu zeigen. Der Aufsatz baut sich um drei thematische Achsen herumauf. Zunächst wird eine historische Darstellung der These der Gefühle über Fiktionen bei Groos, Lipps, Lange, Geiger und Külpe unternommen. Diese bil-det den Rahmen für die Debatte über die Quasi-Gefühle in der Grazer Schule.Anschließend wird die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Diskussion über Quasi-Gefühle bei Meinong, Witasek, Saxinger und Schwarz gerichtet. Zuletzt wer-den die Berührungspunkte zur heutigen analytischen Debatte im Ausgang vonsystematischen Fragen aufgezeigt. (shrink)

Emotions are one of the topics that have caught the attention of analytical philosophy during the past years, and philosophers have developed different theories in this field. In this article, I shall present the main lines of investigation in the current debate on emotions and explain the arguments in favour and against each of them in order to build up my own position on the one hand, and, present the historical developments previous to the analytical theories, showing that the history (...) of philosophy has always had an interest in emotions as a topic on the other hand. (shrink)

Contemporary accounts on fictional emotions, i.e., emotions experienced towards objects we know to be fictional, are mainly concerned with explaining their rationality or lack thereof. In this context dominated by an interest in the role of belief, questions regarding their phenomenal quality have received far less attention: it is often assumed that they feel “similar” to emotions that target real objects. Against this background, this paper focuses on the possible specificities of fictional emotions’ qualitative feel. It starts by presenting what (...) I call the “phenomenological question” about the qualitative feel of fictional emotions (section 1) and by showing that this is irreducible to questions about their cognitive, intentional, evaluative, and embodied nature (section 2). Drawing on some insights from early phenomenologists, the next two sections elaborate criteria to distinguish between real and sham emotions on the one side (section 3) and between genuine and non-genuine emotions on the other (section 4). Finally, I apply this orthogonal distinction to the particular case of fictional emotions (section 5). The paper argues that fictional emotions are neither sham emotions nor quasi-emotions, but full-fledged emotional experiences, despite them displaying the distinctive phenomenology of emotions experienced as non-genuine. In the particular case of fictional emotions, they are non-genuine because our psychology is in fact in a state dominated by aesthetic enjoyment. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore Unamuno’s narrative fictions as thought experiments about self and emotion. I begin by developing a notion of thought experiment consequent with his understanding of philosophy as a form of literature. Next, I focus on the philosophy of the emotions implicit in his major essay Del Sentimiento trágico de la vida. The third section offers a case study in the form of envy in the novel Abel Sánchez. The final section addresses different forms of knowledge about (...) the emotions conveyed by Unamuno’s fictional works. (shrink)

This paper explores “existential envy” as a kind of envy in which the subject targets the rival’s entire being rather than one of her possessions, achievements or talents. It argues that existential envy is characterized by a weakening of the distinction between good and rival and by a strong focus on the envious self. In existential envy, the subject becomes aware that another person is closer to her ideal self than she is, such that the rival painfully reminds her of (...) unfulfilled but now unrealizable possibilities inherent to her being. After motivating the topic in the introduction (section 1), the paper analyzes the intentional object of existential envy, i.e., of what it means that the envier targets the other’s being (section 2). The next section explores existential envy’s focus on the self by examining the series of feelings of diminution in the envier’s own value (section 3). The paper then turns to the set of comparisons between the self and the other and the counterfactual thought “I could have been you!” which is shown to be definitory of this type of envy (section 4). In the final part of the paper, the relation between the envier’s bad self-image, self-reproach, and self-deception is discussed (section 5), before the main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 6). (shrink)

This paper explores one of Unamuno's most challeng-ing short stories: Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos (1918). In this text, Unamuno deals with an experience for which he coins the expression ›self-envy‹. Is ›self-envy‹ conceptually sound? Or is it an unsuitable phrase for an emotional state that has nothing to do with envy? The paper proceeds in three steps in order to answer these questions. After presenting Unamuno’s Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos (section 1), the following section considers the notion of self-envy, which I interpret as a (...) singular but instructive case of envy (section 2). My attention then turns to a more general emotional state, which I interpret using the concept of akratic emotion (section 3). The paper concludes with some considerations as to the use of literature as a form of thought experiment for philosophical purposes. In sum, I show that Artemio can be efectively read as a thought experiment in relation to envy and akrasia, i.e., the state of acting against one’s better judgement. (shrink)

Else Voigtländer (1882–1946) provided one of the first substantial contributions to the phenomenology of the emotions. Her writings, which unfortunately have remained mostly unexplored, anticipate many of the issues that would become major focal points for later phenomenologists working on the topic. Within the phenomenological movement, Voigtländer was one of the first to study phenomena such as Ressentiment, inauthentic feelings and erotic love. In her book Vom Selbstgefühl (On the Feeling of Self-Worth) (1910), she undertakes an exhaustive study of the (...) feelings of self-worth as part of a more ambitious project of elaborating a study of character. Further discussions on feelings, emotions and their relation to values can be found in a series of papers devoted to character traits, political emotions, erotic love and the psychology of sentiments (Voigtländer 1920, 1923, 1928 and 1933). This chapter is divided into four sections. The first presents Voigtländer’s notion of feelings of self-worth (Selbstgefühle). The remaining sections are devoted to her analyses of inauthentic feelings, Ressentiment and other negative attitudes, and erotic love, respectively. (shrink)

Aurel Kolnai (1900–1973) is best known for his political and moral writings, but he also chiefly contributed to the phenomenology of the emotions. In a series of papers devoted to hostile and aversive emotions and, in particular, to disgust, haughty pride, fear, and hatred (Kolnai 1929, 1931, 1935 and 1998) Kolnai presents his most comprehensive views on the affective life and its ethical significance. Scattered discussions on the emotions can also be found in an early paper written on Scheler and (...) under the influence of psychoanalysis (1925), in his dissertation Der ethische Wert und die Wirklichkeit (Ethical Value and Reality) (1927), which is his first phenomenological writing, and in later papers “On the Concept of the Interesting” (1964) and “The Concept of Hierarchy” (1971). This chapter is divided into four sections. The first reconstructs Kolnai’s general approach to the emotions as embedded within the larger context of early phenomenology. Sections 2–4 present Kolnai’s analyses of hostile emotions by focusing on disgust, haughty pride, and hatred. (shrink)

This document presents the Bonn PRINTEGER Consensus Statement: Working with Research Integrity—Guidance for research performing organisations. The aim of the statement is to complement existing instruments by focusing specifically on institutional responsibilities for strengthening integrity. It takes into account the daily challenges and organisational contexts of most researchers. The statement intends to make research integrity challenges recognisable from the work-floor perspective, providing concrete advice on organisational measures to strengthen integrity. The statement, which was concluded February 7th 2018, provides guidance on (...) the following key issues: § 1. Providing information about research integrity§ 2. Providing education, training and mentoring§ 3. Strengthening a research integrity culture§ 4. Facilitating open dialogue§ 5. Wise incentive management§ 6. Implementing quality assurance procedures§ 7. Improving the work environment and work satisfaction§ 8. Increasing transparency of misconduct cases§ 9. Opening up research§ 10. Implementing safe and effective whistle-blowing channels§ 11. Protecting the alleged perpetrators§ 12. Establishing a research integrity committee and appointing an ombudsperson§ 13. Making explicit the applicable standards for research integrity. (shrink)

This paper argues that early phenomenologists used the concept of empathy not only to refer to the direct perception of the other’s experiences – as underscored by contemporary proponents of the Direct Perception Theory – but also to describe – in a sense close to Lipps’s theory and contemporary Simulation Theory – how, by virtue of imagining, we “feel into” animate and inanimate objects. Focusing on this second usage of the term, two kinds of imagination-based accounts of empathy in early (...) phenomenology are identified. According to “radical imaginationists”, empathy can be explained in terms of the series of imaginative processes entailed in the idea of “feeling into”, such as projecting oneself into the target, “imitating” its feelings, and resonating with it. Voigtländer’s account of empathizing with one’s own self in Vom Selbstgefühl (1910) and Geiger’s account of empathy with atmospheres in “Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung” (1911) can in this sense be regarded as radical imaginationist theories. According to “moderate imaginationists”, empathy might (but need not) entail imagining. Stein’s account of empathy with others in On the Problem of Empathy (Zum Problem der Einfühlung) (1917/1989) as a three-step process which can involve imagination-like states is a good example of a moderate imaginationist account. (shrink)

Impairments in pragmatic abilities, that is, difficulties with appropriate use and interpretation of language – in particular, non-literal uses of language – are considered a hallmark of Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC). Despite considerable research attention, these pragmatic difficulties are poorly understood. In this paper, we discuss and evaluate existing hypotheses regarding the literalism of ASC individuals, that is, their tendency for literal interpretations of non-literal communicative intentions, and link them to accounts of pragmatic development in neurotypical children. We present evidence (...) that reveals a developmental stage at which neurotypical children also have a tendency for literal interpretations and provide a possible explanation for such behaviour, one that links it to other behavioural, rule-following, patterns typical of that age. We then discuss extant evidence that shows that strict adherence to rules is also a widespread feature in ASC, and suggest that literalism might be linked to such rule-following behaviour. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich für die These, dass alle Dokumentarfilme darauf abzielen, uns Erkenntnis über einen Aspekt der Realität zu vermitteln. Dieser These zufolge sind Dokumentarfilme – im Unterschied zu anderen Filmgattungen – der Wirklichkeit verpflichtet. Vor diesem Hintergrund sollen in diesem Aufsatz zwei Aspekte genauer untersucht werden: zum einen, wie der kognitive Wert von Dokumentarfilmen genauer zu verstehen ist, und zum anderen, inwiefern ausgehend von diesem epistemischen Aspekt Unterscheidungskriterien zwischen Dokumentarfilmen und anderen Filmgattungen entwickelt werden können. Der Aufsatz (...) gliedert sich in zwei Teile. Im ersten Teil werde ich die Frage untersuchen, inwiefern Dokumentarfilme „Dokumente“ der Realität sind. Dabei werde ich verschiedene Interpretationen des epistemischen Ziels von Dokumentarfilmen besprechen und auch die „Vergegenwärtigungsansicht“ als Ergänzung zu der „assertorischen Ansicht“ (Plantinga, Carroll und Currie) und zu der „Verstehensansicht“ (Dromm) anbieten. Im zweiten Teil sollen die Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen Dokumentarfilmen und Spielfilmen besprochen werden, um genauere Unterscheidungskriterien zu entwickeln. Ich werde hierfür den phänomenologischen Begriff der Imagination (Sartre, Meunier) einführen und seine Produktivität für die Debatte über den kognitiven Wert von Dokumentarfilmen aufzeigen. (shrink)

In this conceptual paper, the traditional conceptualization of sustainable entrepreneurship is challenged because of a fundamental tension between processes involved in sustainable development and processes involved in entrepreneurship: the concept of sustainable business models contains a paradox, because sustainability involves the reduction of information asymmetries, whereas entrepreneurship involves enhanced and secured levels of information asymmetries. We therefore propose a new and integrated theory of sustainable entrepreneurship that overcomes this paradox. The basic argument is that environmental problems have to be conceptualized (...) as wicked problems or sustainability-related ecosystem failures. Because all actors involved in the entrepreneurial process are characterized by their epistemic insufficiency regarding the solving of these problems, the role of information in the sustainable entrepreneurial process changes. On the one hand, the reduction of information asymmetries primarily aims to enable actors to become critical of sustainable entrepreneurs’ actual business models. On the other hand, the epistemic insufficiency of sustainable entrepreneurs guarantees that information asymmetries remain as a source of new sustainable business opportunities. Three further characteristics of sustainable entrepreneurs are distinguished: sustainability and entrepreneurship-related risk-taking; sustainability and entrepreneurship-related self-efficacy; and the development of satisficing and open-ended solutions, together with multiple stakeholders. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza la teoría de las emociones de Brentano, según la cual éstas son actos intencionales basados en juicios y tienen un papel central en el reconocimiento del valor y en la motivación para la acción. Tras una exposición del panorama intelectual de las teorías de las emociones a finales del siglo XIX, sigue el análisis de la teoría de Brentano y de su proyecto ético, para terminar remarcando la influencia de su legado en los autores de (...) la escuela fenomenológica y la filosofía analítica. (shrink)

Ziel des Aufsatzes ist es, das Projekt angewandter interkultureller Philosophie „Briefe über Philosophie weltweit“ vorzustellen. Der Beitrag ist in vier Teile gegliedert. Im ersten Abschnitt werden Anlass und Profil des Projektes vorgestellt. Der „akademische Nomadismus“ der Gegenwart verstärkt die immer schon interkulturelle Verfasstheit der akademischen Praxis und stellt den lebensweltlichen Anlass des Projektes dar, dies in Form von Briefen über die verschiedenen Bedingungen des Philosophierens auch zu reflektieren. Im zweiten Abschnitt wird genauer nach Erfahrungen gefragt, die in den Briefen zum (...) Ausdruck kommen und die wir als „interkulturelle Erfahrungen“ bezeichnen und näher bestimmen wollen. Thema des dritten Abschnitts ist die gewählte Darstellungsform für derartige interkulturelle Erfahrungen, nämlich die Briefform als Medium für Perspektivität. Im vierten Abschnitt machen wir abschließend den Versuch, das Projekt als Form angewandter interkultureller Philosophie zu profilieren. (shrink)

This paper explores how individuals experiencing hostile affective states such as envy, jealousy, hate, contempt, and Ressentiment tend to deceive themselves about their own mental states. More precisely, it examines how the feeling of being diminished in worth experienced by the subject of these hostile affective states motivates a series of self-deceptive maneuvers that generate a fictitious upliftment of the subject’s sense of self. After introducing the topic (section 1), the paper explores the main arguments that explain why several hostile (...) affective states involve a feeling of diminution in the subject’s own value (section 2). Next, it offers an analysis of how the negative feeling of self-worth motivates self-deception. While in extrinsically motivated self-deception, the subject feels diminished in worth after negatively evaluating her own hostile affective states, in intrinsically motivated self-deception, the negative feelings of self-worth are constituent elements of the hostile affective state in question (section 3). Cases of intrinsically motivated self-deception are particularly intriguing because in them the motivation for self-deception is inherent to the hostile affective state, independently of external reasons. I coin the expression “self-deceptive style” to capture the distinctive form in which each hostile affective state intrinsically motivates changes in the architecture of the mind (e.g., perception, imagining, memory, judgment, attention, etc.) in order to generate an upliftment of the self (section 4). To show the descriptive and explanatory function of this concept, a comparative analysis of the self-deceptive styles of envy and hate is provided (section 5). The conclusion summarizes the main findings and explores directions for further research (section 6). (shrink)

Contrary to the tendency to harmony, consensus and alignment among stakeholders in most of the literature on participation and partnership in corporate social responsibility and responsible innovation practices, in this chapter we ask which concept of participation and partnership is able to account for stakeholder engagement while acknowledging and appreciating their fundamentally different judgements, value frames and viewpoints. To this end, we reflect on a non-reductive and ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, inspired by the philosophy of Emmanuel (...) Levinas. We contrast a cognitive approach with an ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, and explore four characteristics of this ethical approach. Based on the ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, we also provide a three-stage framework for partnership formation in CSR and RI practices. (shrink)

Alexius von Meinong hat eine eigene Philosophie der Emotionen entwi-ckelt, die mit Blick auf die heutige Debatte über Gefühle höchst aktuell erscheint. Laut Meinong zeichnen sich die Emotionen durch drei Merkma-le aus: Sie sind leibliche Erfahrungen der Lust oder Unlust; sie gründen in kognitiven Akten wie Wahrnehmungen, Phantasien, Urteilen und Annah-men; und sie intendieren Werte. In diesem Aufsatz wird eine systematische Untersuchung von Meinongs Philosophie der Gefühle sowie von ihrem Einfluss auf die Grazer Schule und ihrer Bedeutung für die aktuelle (...) Debat-te unternommen. Schwerpunkte der Arbeit ist erstens die Verbindung zwi-schen Emotionen und Werten, die stark von den unterschiedlichen Wert-konzeptionen, die Meinong im Laufe seines Werkes vertreten hat, abhän-gig ist. Zweitens geht es um die exemplarische Untersuchung von zwei Ge-fühlsarten, die für den heutige Diskussion von besonderer Bedeutung sind, nämlich Urteilsgefühlen und Phantasiegefühlen. (shrink)

In Vom Selbstgefühl (1910) (identical to Über die Typen des Selbstgefühls), Else Voigtländer undertakes an accurate analysis of a category of feelings named “feeling of self-worth” and its types. This entry presents Voigtländer's definition, characterization and taxonomy of the feeling of self-worth.

Drawing on recent scholarship and delving systematically into Iamblichean texts, these ten papers establish Iamblichus as the great innovator of Neoplatonic philosophy who broadened its appeal for future generations of philosophers.